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STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME 35 AUTUMN 1960 NUMBER 3
THOUGHTS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
ARVAL MORRIS*
What have we better than a blind guess to show that the
criminal law in its present form does more good than harm?
Holmes, The Path Of The Law,
10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 470 (1897)
Sanctified by scripture and hallowed in history, our vengeful urge
to punish has defeated many of our civilizing drives.' It continues to
play a major role in denying the inherent dignity of man.' It is a close
ally of our feeble attempts to cope with our collective selves, and to-
gether, these forces account for the continued use of capital punish-
ment.' But, unlike tuberculosis, things in themselves are neither good
nor desirable simply because we happen to have them, and a plodding
invocation of the death penalty has proved no exception. In 1958
Delaware trumpeted its knell.5 In addition, proposed legislative bills
which would have repealed the measure in California,' Colorado and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
I Exodus XXI, 12: "He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to
death," and Lev. XXIV, 17: "He that killeth any man shall surely be put to death."
In addition, death was the punishment specifically prescribed for witches, Exodus XXII.
18; Lev. XX, 27, and Deut. XVII, 10; as well as for homosexuality and sodomy, Lev.
XX, 13, 15, 16; however, by the time of imperial Rome, the death penalty had been
abolished for Roman citizens. RADIN, THE TRuAL 0F JEsus or NAZARETH 254 (1931).
2 See WEmorEN, THE URGE To PuNisH 130-170 (1956); ALEXANDER & STAUB,
THE CRIMNAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 209-225 (1956), and Redmount, Some
Basic Considerations Regarding Penal Policy, 49 J. Cmu. L., C. & P. S. 426 (1959).
3 BOUDREAU, Mental Health, The New Public Health Frontier 286 Annals 1 (1953).
4 "The limitation of aggression is the first and perhaps the hardest sacrifice which
society demands from each individual." SiGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LEc-
TUREs ON PSYcHoANALYSIS 151 (1933); see also GUTMACHEm & WEIHOFEN, Psy-
CHrATRY AND THE LAW 412 436 (1952), and WEiHoFEN, op. cit. supra note 2.5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 107 (Supp. 1958).6 A.B. 221; see also, New Policy Opposes Capital Punishment, 36 The Open Forum
1, cols. 4 & 5 (April 1959) ; and Report of the California Subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee on Capital Punishment, 20 ASSEmBLY INTrmuM COmmITTEE REPORTS 1
(1957).
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Washington' missed passing by the narrowest of margins-as did an
initiative measure in Oregon.' New Jersey9 and Massachusetts 0 pres-
ently have interim committees studying the problem, and unquestion-
ably, these and other state legislatures will face the problem of capital
punishment when they next convene. How should they decide? Con-
siderations are in flux, and flames fire high about proposals to abro-
gate the death penalty. Does capital punishment really protect soci-
ety? Is it moral? Humane?
Are you satisfied with the way in which your death chamber is cur-
rently begin managed? Should capital punishment be abolished or
kept, and after all, what really is at stake? If current fetishes of
superficial goodwill won't hinder us, we can find reasoned answers.
They unmask their significance against a canvas of the relevant scope,
purposes and results actually obtained by the death penalty.
The legally authorized scope of the death penalty is uniquely un-
even. Since early times, the prescribed punishment by law for first-
degree murder can be death in 40 of our states, the District of Colum-
bia, and the Federal Jurisdiction." Ten states do not allow the pen-
alty for first-degree murder: Alaska, 2 Delaware,"3 Hawaii," Maine,15
Michigan,"8 Minnesota," North Dakota, 8 Rhode Island, 9 South Da-
7H.B. No. 69, 36th Sess. (1959).
8 The margin of defeat was 10,000 votes out of over 500,000 votes cast. LEIGH,
MAN'S RIGHT To LiFE 5 (1959).
9 N. J. Legis. Research Council, Public Hearings Before General Assembly Judiciary
Committee (June 5, 1958).
10 Mass. Legis. Research Council, Preliminary Report of the Unpaid Special Coin-
mission, Established for the Purpose of Investigating and Studying the Abolition of
the Death Penalty in Capital Cases (Jan. 20, 1958).
11 See Comment, Post Conviction Remedies in California Death Penalty Cases, 11
STAN. L. REv. 94, 96 (1958). Since 1950, Georgia stands first in number of executions
with 75; Texas is second with 65 and California third with 62. Id. at 96, n. 2. Since
1950, Washington has executed six, and as of March 24, 1960, three prisoners were in
death row awaiting execution. Letter to the author from B. J. Rhay, Superintendent,
Washington State Penitentiary. [One has since been executed, Seattle Times, June 25,
1960, p. 11, c. 6.1
12Abolished in 1957. ALASKA CoM. LAWS ANN. § 65-4-1 (Supp. 1958).
13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 107 (Supp. 1958).
'4 HAWAII REV. LAWS § 291-5 (Supp. 1957).
'5 ME. REV. STAT. c. 130, 31 (1954). (life imprisonment for murder.)
16 MicH. ComtP. LAWS § 750.316 (1948) (life imprisonment for murder); § 750.544
(1948) (death for treason to state).
17 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 619.07 (West 1947) (life for murder); § 612.01 (West
1947) (life for treason).
18 N.D. REV. CODE § 12-0610 (1943) (maximum punishment for felony is five years
except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by law). But see, N.D. REV.
CODE § 12-0701 (1943) (death for treason) and N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2713 (1943) (life
for first degree murder and death in case a first degree murderer kills another while
serving his sentence).
19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (1956) (life for murder, but death when murder is
committed by a person under life sentence) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-43-1 (1956) (Life
for treason).
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kota, 2  and Wisconsin."' Internationally, England has restricted its
use,2 and Argentina, Queensland, Ecuador, Belgium, Denmark, Uru-
guay, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Western Germany
have all abolished the death penalty as a sanction for murder and the
lesser crimes." However, several retain it for treason because of World
War II quisling experiences.
Legal practices vary in states which allow the death penalty, but a
jury can usually levy or recommend life imprisonment. Nevertheless,
capital punishment flourishes in states which provide the alternate
penalty. In one way or another, this optional life-or-death feature of
legal litany necessitates that jurymen answer: "Do you think this de-
fendant ought to be killed?"2 Citizens shirk this decision and often
refuse to serve on death penalty cases. If this practice of citizen dis-
qualification becomes widespread, it may well raise the question even-
tually of whether the death penalty has systematically excluded citi-
zens to such an extent that it no longer represents a cross section of
the community.
Quite apart from additional problems inherent in this type of ap-
proach, capital punishment in the United States is certainly not con-
fined to first-degree murder cases. In fact, studies reveal that there
is a total of 31 separate and distinct offenses for which it might be
imposed125 Not quite the bloody armada of over 220 separate offenses
punishable by death in 1800 England,"8 but nevertheless, a formidable
number for a presumably life-adoring, civilized nation of the 20th Cen-
tury! Not each state which authorizes capital punishment allows it
20 S.D. CODE § 132012 (1939) (life for murder) ; § 13.0701 (1939) (life for trea-
son) ; but see § 13.2702 (1957) (S.D. SEss. LAWS 1957, c. 32, H.B. 652) (death for
kidnapping for ransom when victim not released unharmed and jury unanimously so
directs; otherwise life).
2
. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (1958) (life for murder); § 946.01 (1958) (life for
treason).
22 Homide Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2 c. 11. For earlier history see Grunhut, Murder
and the Death Penalty in England, 284 Annals 158 (1952).
23 See SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959) ; Lejins, The Death Penalty Abroad 284 Annals 137, 144 (1952), and LAwEs,
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1947).24 RCW 9.48.030 "and in every trial for murder in the first degree, the jury shall, if
it finds the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to whether or not the death
penalty shall be inflicted.. !' This also applies to kidnapping, RCW 9.52.010, but not
treason, RCW 9.82.010, which carries a mandatory death penalty. In 1958 a national
poll by Elmo Roper showed 42% of those questioned to favor the death sentence; 50%
opposed it, and 8% were undecided. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, MODEL PENAL
CODE 13 n. 4 (Tent Draft No. 9, 1959). See, Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discre-
tion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099 (1953).
25 N.J. Legis. Research Council, op. cit. supra note 9, at 17-18.
20 See The Bloody Code in KoESTLER, REFLEcTIONS ON HANGING 7 (1957).
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this wide legal latitude, and its range of warranted application varies
from a low of one crime-murder-to a wide swath in Georgia." In
addition to murder, the punishable offenses widely range from kidnap-
ping,28 treason," and rape ° through armed robbery,3 arson 2 and bur-
glary"3 to spying, 4 castration," perjury,0 and dueling!
In practice too, the actual application of the death penalty is also
uneven, but of a much less comprehensive scope than its legally au-
thorized compass. Of the official capital offenses in the United States,
the death sentence actually has been imposed for only seven crimes
during the last thirty years. An apt illustration is depicted by the
following table:
( Inter alia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (1953) (murder); § 26-801 (1953)(treason) ; § 26-903 (1953) (Insurrection or attempt to incite insurrection) ; § 26-1103
(1953) (foeticide); § 26-1603 (1953) (kidnapping for ransom) ; § 26-1208 (1953)(castration); § 26-2502 (Supp. 1958) (robbery with force or violence); § 26-1302(1953) (rape) ; § 26-5203 (1953) (dueling where death ensues; this section covers
all parties, seconds as well as principals ).
S 2 8 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2304 (1947) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 805.02 (1944) ; IND. ANN.
STAT. § 10-2903 (Burns, 1956) ; Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 435.140 (1959) ; LA. STAT. ANN.§ 14.44 (West 1951); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2238 (1956) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:118-1
(1953) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-25-3 (1953); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1250 (1944); OKL.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 745 (1958); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-91 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-2603 (Supp. 1959) ; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1177a (1948); RCW 9.52.010;
Wyo. STAT. ANN. 6-59 (1959).
29 For example, RCW 9.82.010.
3 0 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 395 (1940) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3403 (1947) ; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 794.01 (Supp. 1959) (death unless a majority of jury recommends
mercy) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (1953) ; Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 435:080 (1959) and
435:090 (1959); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1951); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 461(1957) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2358 (1942) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-21 (1951);
S.C. CODE § 16-72 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3702 (1955).
3
1 Ky. REv. STAT. § 433:140 (1959).
3 2 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 23 (1940) (where arson produces the "death or maim-
ing of any person").
33 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 85 (1940); Ky. REv. STAT. § 433:140 (1959) ; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-52 (1951).
34 S.C. CODE §§ 44-353, 44-354 (1952) (during wartime).
35 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1208 (1953).
30 COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-7-3 (1953) (anyone who secures conviction and execution
of another by perjury mandatorily suffers death in Colorado) ; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
art. 309 (1952) (anyone "tending to produce conviction" by perjuring himself in a
capital case mandatorily suffers death, when the defendant in the capital case was
executed).
87ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2213 (1947) (when death ensues) ; same in Georgia but
there the statute covers seconds as well as principals; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5203
(1953) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 692.1 (1950). In addition, Illinois authorizes death for
those who use dynamite to blow up any munitions plant, arsenal or armory, only when
death results; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 236 (1935) ; and Ohio specifically allows the
penalty where attempt is made to take the life of the President or Vice-President;
OHIO REv. CODE § 2901.09 (1953), or the Governor § 2901.10 (1953) provided death
ensues. This effectively eliminates the lower grades of murder and manslaughter which
do not carry the death penalty.
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Civil Executions in the United States by Offenses
1930-50
Offenses Number Per Cent
Murder 2,645 87.3
Rape 335 11.1
Armed Robbery 17)
Kidnapping 12)
Burglary 10)- 1.6
Espionage (All in 1942) 6)
Aggravated Assault 3)
Unreported 1)
All Offenses 3,029 100
Source: Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment 284
Annals 10 (1952).
The uniquely uneven application of capital punishment extends even
further. Some critics charge, and corroborating facts confirm, that the
death penalty, like all other human institutions, is subject to evasion,
whim, caprice and prejudice. Surreptitiously ignored by its proponents
is the opaque reality that the death penalty is diversely enforced.
Lewis E. Lawes, long a warden of Sing Sing prison, is acutely aware
of these affairs. He wrote that:38
In the twelve years of my wardenship I have escorted 150 men and
one woman to the death chamber and electric chair. In ages they
ranged from 17 to 63. They come from all kinds of homes and en-
vironments. In one respect they were all alike. All were poor, and
most of them friendless. To what end or purpose were these victims
sent to their premature deaths? Ordinarily the answer would be sim-
ple. They killed, therefore, they had to die. A logical point of view,
indeed, if it were applied equally to all who committed unjustified
homicide.
Elsewhere," he contends that the death penalty inherently discrimi-
nates in its selectivity, not because either the law or its juries patron-
izingly favor the rich, the white or the better educated, but because
these groups usually have access to more effective ways and means of
producing capable and reliable witnesses and lawyers. In short sum-
mary, his direct experiences, alongside those bared by other careful
38 LAWES, TwEr.N THOUSAND YExs IN SING SING 302 (1932).
89 Id. at 160.
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investigators,"0 show facts favoring a fair inference that the death
penalty is palpably selective and predominately enforced upon men
rather than women, and more particularly, upon males who are either
Negro, poor, or less well-educated."
Murder is indisputably the most important single offense for which
the guilty are executed, and it accounts for over 87 per cent. It is also
the one crime which hypnotizes public emotions and transfixes the
common rationality whenever capital punishment is discussed, even
though the long-term trend of homicide is definitely downward.2 Mur-
der, an ancient heritage from our Anglo-Saxon background, was de-
fined by the common-law as the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought.43 Needless to say, this loose formulation abounds
with multitudes of problems, particularly when malice aforethought
is redefined simply to require only an intent to inflict death, excluding
considerations of ill will or motive. 4 In addition, no common-law dis-
tinction was made among types of murder. For example, a person who
coldly and deliberately calculated a design to kill another was dealt
with in the same fashion as someone who, although sane, impulsively
killed another without having premeditated, but on an emotional provo-
cation which would not have provoked an ordinary person. These and
other problems inspired law reformers to hit upon the idea of strati-
fying murder, and hence murderers, by degrees, and basically, two
modern statutory patterns have emerged.
The most prevalent model is Pennsylvania's. That State accepts the
common law definition of murder and then provides that certain forms
of common-law murder shall be murder in the first-degree and that all
other types shall be murder in the second-degree. 5 The various types
of murder classified into one degree or the other are pretty much the
same as those grouped by the other solution. The second alternative
abandons the common-law definition. Led by New York, it statutorily
defines both first and second-degree murder with the key distinction
40 Report of the California Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee on Capital
Punishmnent, op. cit. supra note 6, at 25; Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punish-
ment, 284 Annals 8 (1952) ; Sellin, Common Sense and the Death Penalty, PRISON
JOURNAL (1932).
41 "In the 3,666 total mentioned earlier for 1930-1959, 1,972 of those executed were
Negroes, compared with 1,653 whites and 41 other groupings. This means that well
over half were Negroes, though the Negro population comprises about 10 percent of
our nation's total." 30 Harvard Law Record 8 (April 14, 1960).
42 Hartung, op. cit. supra note 40.
43 See, generally, PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 25, 30-40 (1957).
44 See HALL & GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 37-39, 50-51 (1958)
but cf. State v. Horner, 21 Wn.2d 278, 150 P.2d 690 (1944) for Washington's approach.
45 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4701 (Supp. 1959).
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between them being the presence or absence of premeditation and de-
liberation. States following New York variously word their statutes,
but the underlying formula is basically the same:4" The killing of a
human being, unless excusable or justifiable, is murder in the first de-
gree when committed: (1) from a deliberate and premeditated design
to affect death; (2) by any act eminently dangerous to others and
evincing a reckless abandon of social duty regardless of human life,
or (3) without a design to affect death but by a person engaged in
the commission of certain named felonies: robbery, rape,.burglary,
arson or larceny. Murder in the second-degree is then defined as the
killing of a person with a design to affect death but without premedi-
tation or deliberation. The death penalty attaches only to first degree
murder and this, in turn, literally throws life or death significance on
the meaning and requirements of "premeditation" and "deliberation."
The legal interpretation put on these two decisive words is deceiv-
ingly simple and sometimes devastates the distinction between first
and second-degree murder. "Deliberation" has been construed to
relate to a killer's state of mind prior to the act. It requires that the
jury ascertain, as a fact, that before the killing occurred the defend-
ant actually had a mind reasonably free from undue excitement-not
totally devoid of emotion or passion, but reasonably free. In the quaint
words of yesteryear one court has said: "Deliberation means that the
act is done in a cool state of blood."4 So, generally, if a person inten-
tionally kills someone under a sudden flair of excitement which neither
pillaged his reasoning powers nor usually would have provoked an
ordinary person to kill, then he has met the dictates of "deliberation,"
has "cool blood," and can be found guilty of first-degree murder.
Whether jurors are ever equipped to perform this complex psycho-
analytic feat is, obviously, a matter much in heated dispute. Flames
of doubt fire ever higher when the jurors actually perform their diag-
noses under the adverse conditions produced by an emotionally charged
murder trial.
The other term---"premeditation"--relates in part to the span of
time between conceiving the design to kill and executing it.49 Murder
46 N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 1044 (1944).
47 See generally, Brenner, The Impulsive Murder and the Degree Device, 22 Fom-
HAM L. REV. 274, 280 (1953) ; Perkins, The Law of Homicide, 36 J. CRm. L., C.&P.S.
391 (1946) ; Michael & Wecisler, A Ratimale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUm. L.
Rxv. 701, 1261 (1937).
48 State v. Bowser, 214 N.C. 249, 253, 199 S.E. 31, 34 (1938). See also, State v.
Speyer, 207 Mo. 540, 553, 106 S.W. 505 (1907).
49 Pmuuias, op. cit. supra note 43, at 74-76.
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by the clock?" Not quite. Premeditation has been defined to require
that the jury must find, as a fact, that some modicum of thought passed
through the killer's mind beforehand for any length of time, however
short. To satisfy this requirement, the design to kill must show sub-
stantial reflection, but its details need not be fully formed and crystal-
lized nor repeatedly pondered, weighed, reweighed, or sweated over.51
The mind acts with amazing celerity,52 and it is adequate if there has
been time sufficient to turn the thought over, giving it a quick, second
review. This may involve hours or only a moment or two. The law
sets no specified or standard time interval of hours, minutes or seconds,
but requires only the lapse of "some appreciable time."5 Once a jury
decides that the killer has premeditated and deliberated, then they
have no recourse other than to declare their verdict of guilty of mur-
der in the first degree. Then, consistent with the dictates of capital
punishment, they must decide whether they, in turn, want to kill him.
At first glance the Washington scene appears different from the one
described above, but this is because Washington's first-degree murder
statute is deceptive. The basic New York approach has been followed
and first and second degree murders are statutorily defined rather than
relying on the common law of murder. However, unlike many criminal
statutes which were lifted verbatim from the New York penal code,5"
Washington has not seen fit to make a literal copy of New York's first-
degree murder statute. Instead, the term "deliberation" has been omit-
ted, and in Washington, first-degree murder occurs whenever a human
being is killed "with a premeditated design to effect the death of the
person killed, or of another."5 Statutorily then, "premeditation" be-
comes the distinguishing criterion between first and second-degree
murder lumping all other unjustifiable or non-excusable killings as
second-degree murder when they are committed "with a design to effect
the death... but without premeditation."5  Second-degree murder
cannot carry the death penalty in Washington.57
Does this mean then that Washington does not require "delibera-
tion" as a necessary ingredient of a capital case? Not at all. Similar
5 0 Knudson, Murder By The Clock, 24 WASH. U.L.Q. 305 (1939) (a good discus-
sion of premeditation and deliberation and their occasional blurring).
51 Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 469 (1946).
52 CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do For Law, in LAW AND LITrRATURE AND OTHR
ESSAYS 96 (1931).
53 State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 627, 55 Atl. 473, 476 (1903) ; PERKiNs, op. cit.
supra note 43, at 74-76.54 Compare RCW 9.01.070 with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2 (1944) (attempts).
55 RCW 9.48.030 (1).
56 RCW 9.48.040 (1).
57 Ibid.
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to other jurisdictions which statutorily require both elements, the
Washington Court has construed "premeditation" in the usual, way,
i.e., there must be an indefinite but appreciable lapse of time between
forming the intent to kill and the actual killing, thereby allowing a
showing of "a mental operation of thinking upon an act before carry-
ing it out.""8 This requirement "may involve no more than a moment
in point of time."5
On the other hand, by using the doctrine of mitigation, the Wash-
ington court has also built the usual requirements of deliberation into
our statute. This means that considerations of provocation and of a
defendant's emotional state immediately prior to a killing are rele-
vant."0 "If, therefore, the offered evidence had any tendency to nega-
tive premeditation and deliberation, which are essentials of murder in
the first degree, it should have been admitted.""' State v. Duncan2
upheld an instruction against a contention that it "did away with the
idea of deliberation" 3 on the ground that the instruction had conveyed
the necessary message and had required deliberation. And, again in
State v. Holmes" a first-degree murder conviction, the Washington
court held that the test of a premeditated design was whether a rea-
sonable man's emotions would have subsided between a quarrel and
a killing and not whether the defendant's "passions as a matter of
fact did not cool.""5
In sum then, it can be seen that Washington, too, requires a show-
ing of both "premeditation" and "deliberation" prior to a first-degree
murder conviction,, but it has reached this result by a case construc-
tion of our statute.
The totality of the court room complex consisting as it does of wit-
nesses, judges, jurors and opposing attorneys milling midst adroit, if
confusing, expertise and hairline distinctions, presents a formidable
atmosphere for a calm and rational determination of premeditation and
deliberation. One cogent observer has characterized the substantive
criminal law as "an island of technicality in a sea of discretion.""8 Dis-
5 8 State v. Duncan, 101 Wash. 542, 544, 172 Pac. 915 (1918); see also, State v.
Homer, 21 Wn.2d 278, 150 P.2d 690 (1944).
5 State v. Davis, 6 Wn.2d 696, 706, 108 P.2d 641 (1940) ; see also, State v. Arata,
56 Wash. 185, 105 Pac. 227 (1909) ; and State v. Rutten, 13 Wash. 203, 43 Pac. 30
(1895).60 State v. Gounagias, 88 Wash. 304, 153 Pac. 9 (1915).
61 Id. at 311, 153 Pac. at 11-12 [Emphasis added].
62 State v. Duncan, supra note 58.
6s Id. at 545, 172 Pac. at 916.
84 12 Wash. 169, 40 Pac. 735 (1895).
65 Id. at 183, 40 Pac. at 739. See also State v. Gounagias, supra note 60.
66 HAm. & GLuEcm, op. cit. supra note 44, at 3.
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tinct from the discretion usually residing in judge or jury to find "de-
liberation" or "premeditation," or to impose capital punishment, there
also exists discretion in the police regarding arrest." More impor-
tantly, there is discretion in the prosecutor whether to prosecute at
all, and if so, for what crime and degree? These areas all require
decisions to be made, and presumably, they are supposed to reflect a
reasoned appreciation and promotion of the ends to be served by our
criminal law.
Reasoned answers will escape us unless we first consider the way in
which capital punishment is supposed to serve the end purposes of
law, and how far its current application can achieve them. This is
a difficult and controversial matter, subject to blazing debate, but
evidence is beginning to point a predominating pathway. Common
throughout the entire law are the two major problems which conspicu-
ously confront the criminal law: What behavior should be made crimi-
nal, and what should be done with persons who commit crimes?6" To
protect and sanctify the dignity of human life itself, our society has
evolved the highly technical crime of murder in the first degree as its
basic anti-social act. Furthermore, it has attached the death penalty
as the extreme sanction for its commission, a most drastic sanction,
and it is absolutely non-reversible. Proponents and abolitionists alike
agree that the scope of this severe and absolute punishment should be
no wider than necessary for the protection of society, but there is little
agreement on how wide a scope the protection of society demands."
As previously indicated, there are many differing capital crimes un-
evenly distributed in the United States today.
Criminal punishment is supposed to find its goal by serving three
principal purposes-retribution, deterrence, and reformation."0 The
relative importance of these three objectives has varied throughout
history, and authoritative commentators have wavered, periodically
emphasizing one or the other of them, sometimes to the exclusion of
07 See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke The Criminal Process 69 YALE
L. J. 543 (1960).
68 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 6 (1940).
69 The American Law Institute rejects "the usual determinants of capital murder
in the states where the degree division is employed. The reason is that we are thor-
oughly convinced that neither premeditation and deliberation nor the fact that the
homicide occurred in the commission of a felony included in the typical enumeration
provides criteria which include all homicides that arguably should be dealt with by
the highest santion or exclude all homicides that should not be. The delimitation there-
fore is unsatisfactory. It is at once too narrow and too broad." MODEL PENAL CODE
68 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
70VON HENTIG, PUNISHMENT: ITS ORIGIN, PURPOSE AND PSYCHOLOGY 126-147
(1937) ; Redmount, op. cit. supra note 2, at 426.
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the others. It is necessary to consider each of them in relation to
capital punishment.
REFORMATION
Although reformation of a criminal offender is quite properly re-
garded as a most important function of punishment,7 its relation to
the death penalty can be handled summarily. It obviously has no
reformative effect on the prisoner who is on the receiving end because
in no way can this particular punishment aid in re-establishing him to
a normal life as a good citizen. This does not mean that murderers
cannot be rehabilitated; far from it. The evidence unequivocally points
to the contrary." In states and foreign countries without capital pun-
ishment, prospects for rehabilitation are equally as good, if not better,
for murderers than other types of criminal offenders. 11 It is widely
known that most murderers are first offenders who have had no prior
criminality whatsoever." They usually have led exemplary lives as
hard-working family men, often being overly conscientious. 5 For
many, their scrape with the law came within an emotionally charged
situation. Their uncontrolled, hostile impulses boiled up and could no
longer be repressed. Usually, they impulsively killed someone very
close to them-a husband, wife, sweetheart, brother or sister, or good
friend."' In this emotional setting the fear of the death penalty has
no immediate meaning. Neither are murderers likely to commit the
same crime again. In fact, their rate of recidivism is among the low-
est.77
71 Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HAv. L. REv. 1097, 1102,
1122 (1952) ; Lukas, A Criminologist Looks At Criminal Guilt, 2 SocIAL MEANING OF
LEGAL CoNcEPrs 113 (1950) ; ZI BOORG, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 246 (1943) ; Des-
sion, Psychiatry And The Conditioning Of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE LJ. 319 (1938).72 ROYAL COMMiSSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT (1954) ; N. J. Legis. Re-
search Council, op. cit. supra note 9, at 64, and see LEOPOLD, Lnn PLUS NINETY-NINE
YEARS (1958).73 
RoYAL CoMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, op. cit. supra note 72, at appendix
15, 486-491.74 See, testimony of Dr. Philip Roche, N. J. Legis. Research Council, op. cit. 4upra
note 9, at 47-56.7 5 
"There are many good qualities in even the worst murderer. Over 70% of
murderers have no previous criminal record. Itis a well-known fact that 'lifers' whose
crime was murder make the most trustworthy prisoners and that, as any prison chaplin
will testify, many of them live the lives of saints as an atonement for their act." LAWES,
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 6 (1940).76 GUTTmACHER, Criminal Responsibility In Certain Homicide Cases Involving Fain-
ilv Members, in HocH & ZuBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE: LAW 73-96 (1955) ; Tuteur,
Murdering Mothers 116 Amd. J. PSY cHIATRY 447 (1959); Peacock, What Makes A
Man Kill? 73 Maclean's Magazine 13, 53 (Feb. 13, 1960).7 See, testimony of Dr. Roche, N. J. Legis. Research Council, op. cit. supra note
9, at 64; Report of the California Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee on Capital
Punishment, op. cit. supra note 6, at 12-15, and Mayers, Mum AND NON-NEGLIGENT
MANSLAUGHTER: A Statistical Study, 3 ST. Louis U. L. J. 18, 27 (1954).
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The evidence shows that they make the best parolees 8 as well as the
best prisoners."9 Uniformly, these people have drifted into the more
trusted prison jobs such as being messengers, running errands to and
from prisons and cities, and in one of our Southern prisons, a mur-
derer is the keeper of the gate through which you go in and out!"0 But,
if one thing is clear, it surely is that capital punishment does not re-
habilitate the killer; all rehabilitation is pre-empted by the penalty.
RETRIBUTION
Retribution is often confusing because it is used in several ways-
sometimes to focus on vengeance, vindicating our innate, uncontrolled
urge to punish, and at other times, its reference has been reprobation."1
Retribution, in the vengeance sense, has as its prevailing idea the ex-
pression that society itself is a living entity which has somehow been
harmed by the commission of a murder and must avenge itself.82 The
formula is the classic tradition befitting a childish consciousness of an
eye for an eye and a life for a life. This is wholly indefensible." Yet,
carried out according to its logic, the theory of retribution would allow
torture of a criminal. Why not "put out his eyes, cut out his tongue, beat
him into insensibility and then revive him so that at last he will know
the agony of being flayed alive and boiled in oil?"" All of this is con-
sistent with retribution theory, but ought retribution be a proper goal?
Should it be deemed a proper goal, can our retaliatory urge only be
78 For example, California shows that between 1946-49 homicide parolees had only
a 2.5% return for parole violations, but robbery parolees had a 20.8% return, burglary
25.6%, forgery 30.6% and auto. theft 31.1%, LEIGH, op. cit. supra note 8, at 18.
79 Though reformation is given much lip service, correctional institutions are woe-
fully weak in competent treatment personnel. In 1958, there was a grand total of 32
psychiatrists distributed throughout all state institutions housing adult offenders-
over 175,000 inmates l 15 were in California, New York claimed 5, and these added
to Michigan's 4 account for over half, leaving nine psychiatrists for 45 states I Washing-
ton had one. National Prisoner Statistics Personnel in State and Federal Institutions,
Table I, Federal Bureau of Prisons (Jan. 1960) ; see also, Willie, Psychiatric Facili-
ties In Prisons And Correctional Institutions 114 Am. J. PSYcHIATRY 481 (1957).
80 This view is corroborated by Washington facts. Two convicted murders have
been chosen as babysitter-nurses for Warden Rhay's five daughters. "Certainly, we
trust them with the children. They're almost like members of the family." The Seattle
Times, Page 1, Cols. 5 & 6 (March 6, 1960) ; similarly see, Lawes, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT, ENcY. OF CRIMINOLOGY 44 (1949). In Ohio, the Governor's mansion is served
by ten convicted murders-nine are serving life terms and one is a parolee. Five of
them remain on the premises all night long. See Governor Michael V. DeSalle's com-
ments in A.B.A., Proceeding of Section On Criminal Law 9-10 (1960).
81 OYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, op. cit. supra note 72, at 17, 18.
82 It is "highly desirable that criminals should be hated, that the punishments inflicted
upon them should be so contrived as to give expression to that hatred." 2 STEPHENS,
A HISTORY Op THE CRIMINAL LAW 82 (1883) ; ALEXANDER & STAUB, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 215-219 present a psychoanalytic explanation for the retaliatory impulse.
83 But cf. Carrington, The Moral Quality Of The Criminal Law, 54 Nw. U. L. REv.
575 (1959).
84 Caldwell, Why Is The Death Penalty Retained? 284 Annals 45 (1952).
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satisfied with death, or could life imprisonment serve equally well?
Modem penology discounts the vengeance approach to punishment with
its focus on the crime, and not the criminal." But this advanced think-
ing is restricted and so far has failed to capture widespread admiration
from either judiciary or general public. 6
Apart from its self-defeating approval of our most uncivilized urge,
retribution, when viewed as vengeance, is defective on other grounds.
It cannot be made into a workable principle in practical application.
Does a life really equal a life, or a leg, or fifteen prison years? Lacking
omniscience, how can mere man measure the exact number and degrees
of guilt involved in a crime and then dole out an equivalent amount of
pain? Will we use a pain-guilt meter? And where might we get one?
Moreover, isn't it impossible to inflict pain and death on the guilty
murderer without also imposing pain and suffering upon their equally
innocent relatives and friends? How can this be measured? Or justi-
fied? Can we honestly specify the addition to social welfare which is
the only conceivable justification for such official maltreatment of
guiltless citizens? But more important than all these criticisms is the
key one. No law can be either justified or criticized merely because it
punishes or fails to punish the morally guilty inflicting penalties pro-
portioned to guilt. The end of law, and hence its criterion of judgment,
lies in its services toward promoting the good life. The specific capacity
of the criminal law to achieve this end inheres in its power to control
or prevent socially undesirable behavior. This goal is obviously not
promoted by vengeance when society one moment sanctifies and shelters
human life and in the next moment schizophrenically snuffs it out. To
kill deliberately and with premeditation in the name of law, society,
and morality is a distressing contradiction at best.
Retribution in the sense of reprobation, or public disapproval, is
always an essential element in any form of punishment. The goal of
reprobation is served not only by capital punishment but by all other
forms as well. However, to the exact degree that the death penalty
uniquely stigmatizes first-degree murder as the gravest of crimes, cre-
ating a community abhorrence of murder as "the crime of crimes," then
it is arguable that the death penalty does promote the ends of criminal
85 Bwm, & TEErERs, NEw HoRizoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY 440-464 (1959); Frym,
Past and Future of Criminal Rehabilitatim, 3 J. PUB. LAw 451 (1955).
So Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957) cert. denied 340 U.S. 940
(1957) ; Jackson v. United States, 102 Fed. 473 (9th Cir. 1900) ; but cf. William v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), and Orme v. Rogers, 32 Ariz. 502, 260 Pac. 199
(1927).
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law and curtails anti-social behavior." Briefly, the idea is that capital
punishment is a concrete expression of society's disapproval. Therefore,
it exerts an exemplary moralizing influence helping to form and
strengthen the public's moral code by creating conscious and uncon-
scious inhibitions against committing murder. Conceivably this might
come about either by an appeal to a person's morality through public
disapproval of murder, or purely as habit formed from fear of an un-
equivocal sanctioning authority.88
A widely diffused effect on society's moral consciousness is a power-
ful influence and ought not be overlooked. But, the way to secure proof
of the degree and scope of reprobation is puzzling at best. Like the pain-
guilt meter, one cannot buy a moral meter either. The precise degree
of public stigma stamped on the crime of murder currently is a mystery
and probably always will be, for moral measurements are lacking. Con-
sequently, we do not know the force of moral suasion generated by the
death penalty. But, to adhere rigorously to this argument in defense of
retribution is to confuse the retributive-reprobation element of the law
with its function as a deterrent, a separate matter.
DETERRENCE8
Much success in the trend of penal reform is due to the indefatigable
advocates who seek to prevent crime by deterring its commission. En-
lightened discussion of the value of capital punishment is frequently
devoted to its deterrent effects. But does capital punishment actually
deter crime? It obviously deters the convicted killer, but the idea of
deterrence is one of general prevention, operating on society at large.
This is the only conceivable moral ground which a state can have which
will justify it in taking a citizen's life. It is, simply, that one man's
death is necessary and indispensable for the protection and preservation
of many other citizens' lives. This means that the deterrence theory
places the burden of proof on capital punishment advocates to show
clearly that the death penalty actually deters. Otherwise, justification
for the taking of life is lacking.
This supposed function of the death sentence presents perplexing
problems which are extraordinarily difficult to solve solely by con-
clusive arguments either way. The arguments and supporting facts fall
87 ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, op. cit. supra note 72.
88 Redmount, op. cit. supra note 2, at 434; Andenaes, General Prevention--Ilhwsion
or Reality? 43 J. CRm. L.,C.&P.S. 176, 179 (1952).
89 The heart of deterrence theory was pithily capsulated by Fichte when he said,
"The end of all penal laws is, that they may not be applied." FICHTE, THE SCIENCE OF
RIGHT 345 (1869).
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into three compartments: (1) the common-sense position; (2) exam-
ination of mass statistics; and (3) psychological analysis of individual
murderers.
The common-sense, a priori position is both simple and strong in its
clarity and favors the uniquely deterrent power of capital punishment
over all other punishments as a murder preventative. Its chief prop is
a view of human nature which seats its case in the proposition that
man is a rational, life-loving, fear-driven animal who fears instant death
and, under its threat, will respond in socially acceptable ways. The
argument simply states that no other punishment can capably deter
men so effectively from committing crimes. It submits a proposition
most difficult of proof. Its wellspring is a belief that no one goes to cer-
tain, inevitable death except by external compulsion. When this is linked
with the awesome threat of instant death, it is counted on to trigger a
man's fear for his life thereby preventing prospective murder. "All that
a man hath, he will give for his life.""0 Man fears death. Any secondary
punishment, however terrifyingly painful, offers hope; but death is
death; its terrors cannot be further described, and it has no true
alternative.
Apart from common sense not being very common, the common-sense
argument is hard to evaluate. Capital punishment concededly has failed
as a general deterrent whenever a murder is committed for if general
prevention were 100 per cent effective, all citizens would be law-abiding.
There would be no crime at all."' We can count its failures, but we can-
not number its successes. Because the common-sense position succors
stamina from our ignorance, for we do not know how many people re-
frain from committing murder under pain of execution, we may be
doomed to prodigious palaver about it without ever having sufficient
evidence to wag our tongues conclusively. However, a couple of things
are known.
The common-sense proponents all rely on the existence of a strong,
popular association between murder and fear of the death penalty.
This means that the death sentence must be instant and inescapably
certain to constitute an effective deterrent. To the extent that possibili-
ties of escaping it exist, whether due to non-detection or flaws in the
criminal law process, then the calculated fear of the death penalty can
be taken into account, and it becomes a less likely deterrent.
The truth of the matter is that very few murderers are actually exe-
90 Quoted in RoYAL CommIssIoN ow CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT, op. cit. supra note
72, at 19.91 Andenaes, op. cit. supra note 88.
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cuted.92 There is almost always the possibility of an alternative life
sentence. Besides pardons, the exploits of Caryl Chessman classi-
cally portray the game of legal dominoes which, when properly played,
delays execution many, many years.9" In fact, capital punishment falls
very far short of its common-sense requirement of threatening instant
and certain death to every murderer. One out of four murderers commit
suicide, and we execute only one out of about fifty, as compared to one
in twelve for England before the death penalty was restricted there."
This token indulgence of capital punishment drastically destroys its
deterring impact and allows prospective murderers to calculate its
probability.
If we are truly interested in making the death penalty into an effec-
tive deterrent, then surely we must stop the long trend which has
humanized punishment during the last 300 years, moving from bloody
and heinous sanctions savored by the medieval mind to our present
nonviolent types. More! The trend must be reversed. To implement
deterrence, the jury, when asked, "Do you wish to kill this defendant
before you?" must abstemiously say "YES"! And after we narrow the
legal avenues of escape and reprieve, we must see to it that the execu-
tion is rapidly and emphatically done. No execution can be permitted
in the silent secrecy of prison chambers, but all must be accompanied
by wide-spread fanfare which will associate the death penalty and
murder in the public mind. These changes are necessary to afford de-
terrence the circumstances in which it might work its bit, and perhaps
the best way to insure this would be to televise all executions!
A bigger stumbling block than the failure to threaten instant death
to prospective murderers lies in the way of the common-sensers who
seek to justify capital punishment as a deterrent. It can be simply put
as a defective, Eighteenth-Century view of man. The mainstay prop
of their argument is steadfastly buried in a view of man's human nature
as basically rational and life-loving; he rationally fears death knowing
92 For example, in 1951, excluding rapists and kidnappers, there were approximately
7,000 murders and non-negligent manslaughters in the U.S. and about 1658 were
sentenced for murder-between 750 to 800 for first degree murder. Vold, Extent and
Trend of Capital Crimes in the U.S., 284 Annals 1, 7 (1952). However, only 105
persons were actually executed during 1951. National Prisoner Statistics, Executions
Table I, No. 20. Federal Bureau of Prisons (Feb. 1959). The actual number of execu-
tions varies annually and is declining. Currently, only about 600%6 of those sentenced
to death are actually executed. SUTHERLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 562 (1947).
9s See, COMMENT, Post Conviction Remedies in California Death Penalty Cases, 11
STAN. L. Ra,. 94 (1958).
94 Testimony of Dr. Roche, N.J. Legis. Research Council, op. cit. supra note 9 at 44.
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that it inevitably follows on the heels of a premeditated murder. 9 Now
this psychology is simply defective, and man is as much an emotional
being as he is rational. Many motives actually produce murder. Besides
material gain, murder is inspired by the widest range of emotions-
mercy killings, sexual jealousy, boredom, pity, exasperation, revenge,
etc.9" The drives operate under varying conditions of tinged sentiment-
ality and colored emotions. We know that some masochistic people
commit premeditated murder in hopes that they will suffer execution. "7
Actually, the death penalty can serve as a stimulant to crime for (1)
the suicidal who feel that death is proper atonement for their imagined
sins and murder is the proper way to invoke death, (2) those who are
attracted by the lure of violence and use physical force during a felony,
(3) the exhibitionist who feels that he will be the glitter of a spectacular
trial.9" Nor are all victims innocent; some actually wish to precipitate
a murderous attack on themselves.9 Even more important is other
available evidence. It shows only a small portion of premeditated mur-
ders are actually conceived under circumstances where the triggering
mechanism of fear could possibly deter. This is true even though the
murderer is legally sane. He simply has been provoked to kill by swell-
ing circumstances which he could not handle internally and premedi-
tated a death under conditions which do not excuse. These circum-
stances would not have inspired an ordinary person. The killer qualifies
under our murder statutes for he probably knows right from wrong;
that is, that he should not kill. In the usual case he does not sufficiently
suffer from such a mental defect to qualify under the rules of legal in-
sanity, and hence, is legally accountable for his acts.
One careful investigator, Professor Albert Morris, patiently con-
sidered 2,700 murders that occurred in the United States during 1951.100
"Of my 2,700 cases, only thirty-seven were clearly planned or intended
to gain economic, political, or other considered ends such as relief from
suffering (as in so-called mercy killings) or even a planned vengeance.
9; See, Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of The Death Penalty, 284 Annals 54,
55 (1952).
06 See, GuTrAAcH.R, THE MixD OF THE MuEwR (1960).
97 "[T]his unconscious need for punishment ... behaves like a part of the conscience,
like the prolongation of conscience into the unconscious; and it must have the .same
origin as conscience, that is to say it will correspond to a piece of aggressiveness which
has been internalized and taken over by the superego." SImTND FREuD, NEW INTRO-
DUcToRY LEcTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 149-50 (1933) ; See also, FREuD, THE EGO AND
THE ID, 71-2, n. 72 (1950).98 WEmoFEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 161.
99 Radzinowicz (Ed.), Sexual Offenses XV-XVI, 83-109 (1957), and Hentig, The
Criminal And His Victim, part 4 (1959).
100 A. MoRRIs, HOMICmE: AN APPROACH To THE PROBLEM OF Clumm (1955).
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The large number of cases of stabbing, beating with and without weap-
ons, strangling and pushing is associated with quarrels in which a killer
simply makes use of a bottle, a poker, a tire iron, or whatever happens
to be handy and who resorts to feet and fists, if there is nothing more
serviceable at his disposal."'' Again, "Murders are chiefly visce-
rogenic or 'gut-type' responses of the uncontrolled id."' 2 Only thirty-
seven of 2,700 murders were found clearly intended and planned for
private gain; that is, rationally and coldly thought out. The fear of
capital punishment failed to deter them. Capital punishment conceiv-
ably might deter breaking of police regulations, building codes, traffic
ordinances or even income-tax evasion, and perhaps similar white-collar
crimes having high components of pure rationality.' Fear may play
a role in the "rational" crimes. But its work is disastrously weakened
when the emotions take over.
So much for the common-sense favorings of capital punishment;
what does an examination of mass statistics show? The most important
statistical question asked is: If we were to abolish capital punishment
would we experience an upsurge of murder? The answer is sought either
by comparing statistics for the same period between two neighboring
states-one having the death penalty and the other not, or by compar-
ing homicide statistics within a single state both before and after abol-
ishing the death penalty.
Generally speaking, it is almost impossible to draw valid compari-
sons under this procedure because of differing legal definitions of
crimes, various court methods, shifting moral standards and differing
political, social and economic conditions. However, some closely knit
states do approximate a statistical unit and satisfy the necessary con-
ditions which justify valid comparisons to be drawn. It is these studies
which unmask the most important statistical conclusions.' 4 In truth,
they really do not afford a conclusion at all, for they fail to link the
threat of death with the commission of murder.' Professor Thorsten
Sellin, unquestionably our greatest authority in this area, has exhaust-
ed the matter. He finds it impossible to declare that capital punish-
101 Id. at 15.
102 Ibid.
103 Andenaes, op. cit. supra note 88, at 181-195.
104 Testimony of Mr. Cobin, N.J. Legis. Research Council, op. cit. supra note 9, at 31.
A wealth of statistical evidence, which confirms these views, can be found in Appendix
6-The Deterrent Value of Capital Punishment, in ROYAL CoMMISSION ON CAPrrAL
PUNISHMENT, op. cit. supra note 72, at 328-380.
105 Report of the California Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee on Capital
Punishment, op. cit. supra note 6, at 27-30.
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ment either does or does not deter the crime of murder.0 6 Nor can
conclusive evidence be found which indicates that its abolition will
raise the rate of unlawful homicide or that its restoration will decrease
it. In short, mass statistics really tell us precious little about how, or
to what extent, capital punishment affects a community.
Of greater significance, and tolling the bells for deterrent devotees,
are Professor Sellin's additional comments. "The important thing to
be noticed is that, whether the death penalty is used or not, both death
penalty states and abolition states show rates which suggest that these
rates are conditioned by other factors than the death penalty.' 1 7 In
other words, fear of death is probably an afterthought among murder-
ers rather than a customary forethought; 08 the act of murder, itself,
resting firmly on other determining factors. Other experiences 10 9 sup-
port this view with one possible exception being that of the hard-core
criminal whose professional activities might possibly be curtailed
slightly from carrying a lethal weapon lest the temptation to use it in
a tight corner should prove irresistible. But, since our rate of capital
executions is so low and legal loopholes so many, even he may com-
pute these factors into his calculations as part of the risks involved in
his vocation.11
The common-sense position and facts of mass statistics yield little
sustenance to those who rely on deterrence for justifying capital pun-
ishment. It might possibly be effective as a nonmeasurable, moral-
izing element, and also, it might prove a factor reckoned with by the
scant few professional criminals who murder for gain. But we can-
not say that, even with professional criminals, capital punishment
performs more effectively than would assured life imprisonment.1
10 ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Op. cit. supra note 72, at 345-351.
"Within each group of states having similar social and economic conditions and popu-
lations, it is impossible to distinguish the abolition state from the others.... The in-
evitable conclusion is that executions have no discernible effect on homicide death
rates which, as we have seen, are regarded as adequate indicators of capital murder
rates." SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, MODEL PENAL CODE 34 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).1o7 Id. at 352.
20a See Ball, The Deterrence Concept In Criminology And Law, 46 J. CM. L.,
C. & P.S. 347 (1955).109 NEUSTATTER, THE MIND OF THE MuRDmm (1957) ; BRomBERG, CRIME AND THE
MIND (1948) and GuTTmAcHER, op. cit. .supra note 76.110But cf. England's position. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2c. 11, allows the
death penalty in cases of "any murder by shooting." The MODEL PENAL CODE, currently
in draft, retained the death penalty by a vote of two to one. MODEL PENAL CODE §201.6
(Tent Draft No. 9, 1959). But, before it may be administered one of eight "aggravating
circumstances",must be found.
11 "the experience of the civilized world proves as conclusively as the most rigor-
ously sifted evidence can ever prove, that the gallows is no more effective than other
non-lethal deterrents." KoEsTLER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 59. -
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In fact, we most likely would not tolerate a rigorous, wholesale use
of capital punishment, and therefore, its continued existence depends
upon its rarity. Consequently, its ineffectiveness as a deterrent is in-
sured. This necessarily means that general deterrence is more illu-
sion than reality. Perhaps the threat of deterrence could better suc-
ceed if there were an absolute and assured threat of detection and
imprisonment, rather than the flimsy fear generated from a one-in-ten
chance of suffering death.112 Otherwise, capital punishment appears
to be a feeble deterrent at best and hardly worthwhile, for it seems
neither to protect society nor to deter crime. Psychological informa-
tion derived from examinations of individual murderers tends to con-
firm these beliefs.
Psychiatrists believe murderers do not have a single, societal state
of mind; consequently, the underpinning of deterrence, springing from
fear, really has slight, if any, relevance for them all. If deterrence
has any relevance, it may apply to our law-abiding, noncriminal citi-
zens who are already and likely to continue law-abiding. These peo-
ple have internalized society's life-adoring standards and present
mental conditions where deterrent fear might work its course. Not
so with murderers.
To be a constantly working deterrent, outweighing life imprison-
ment, capital punishment must operate off an invariable state of mind,
inviolably found in all murderers. The fear of death singularly must
outweigh all pleasurable prospects of gain in a manner uniquely greater
than could the fear of life imprisonment. Defenders of deterrence
hold this state of affairs is actually a fact of life.113 This is pap and
nonsense and not borne out by facts. We know that in any commu-
nity we will find many deviant members who are predetermined to a
greater or lesser degree by pathological and criminal tendencies which
outweigh the deterring effect of any punishment, including capital
punishment. If these people murder, the fear of capital punishment
simply fails to operate. Their psychological thresholds are such that
they don't consider the death penalty before they commit the crime.
Often, they are plagued by a morbid attraction toward death rather
112 Sellin, op. cit. supra note 40, at 12. In 1949 there were "an estimated 23,370
cases of murder, non-negligent manslaughter and rape... there were only 119 execu-
tions carried out in the entire United States. In 1953 there were 62 persons executed
in this country. In that same year there were over 7,000 cases of murder and non-
negligent manslaughter. At that rate, the criminal's chances of escaping execution are
better than 100 to 1." A.B.A., PROCErINGS OF SECTION ON Csm~iNAL LAW, 16 (1960).
113 See testimony of Officer Donahue, N.J. Legis. Research Council, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 5-A to 26-A.
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than assiduously seeking its avoidance and have only a vague appre-
ciation that they might be executed."' These people are not neces-
sarily insane and though they might constitute society's marginal men,
perhaps not, it is impossible to say that they are singularly of a de-
terrable state of mind. To persist in this folly is to consult the wisdom
of the ostrich.
Yet, what about the bright but conniving killer who soberly plans
death for plunder? Does capital punishment have a uniquely deter-
ring impact on him? Again, most psychologists would say no."5 The
reason is that these people fail to follow approved mores. They have
chosen a life of crime and take calculated risks. They reckon capital
punishment as one of its elements. They do not possess a deterrable
state of mind. A love of life and fear of death is needed if the death
penalty is to work its preventative course. These criminals lack both.
They calculate the risks and take their chances. The death penalty
actually doesn't stop them from killing. The matter is reduced to a
delightfully risky game of chance in their minds. These misfits haven't
formed a societal ego-ideal; they do not share in a widespread appre-
ciation of life. For people of this mental make-up deterrence is of
no value; it may work on society's law-abiding citizens for they prob-
ably present promising mental climates conductive to its operations,
but not so with the person who coldly calculates a premeditated death
for profit."' To him life is slight, both his own and yours. At most,
it is a fraction of the sum. So, whether we consider the conniving
killer to whom life is but a slender reed or the partially predetermined
person who kills, psychology leads to explanatory paths other than
murder prevention via fear of the death penalty. Directly put, psy-
chology does not support the belief that the fear of death is an effec-
tual deterrent to crime."7
In fact, if deterrence theory actually were carried to its logical con-
clusion, guilt is not an essential item! Suspicion is enough. No proved
"Z Id. at 59. See also, GuTTMAcHER, THE MIND OF THE MURDERER (1960). "Un-
consciously, every criminal bargains for prison or the electric chair." BERGLER, THE
SUPEREGO: UNCONSCIOUS CONSCIENCE 23 (1952).
115 Id. at 62.
116. The superego's "chief function remains the limitation of satisfactions" accom-
plished through a feeling of guilt--an internalized pain. FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 19 (1949) ; see also, Jones, The Genesis Of The Superego, PAPERS
oN PSYCHOANALYSIS 145 (1948), and BERGLER, Supra,, Note 114. Aldous Huxley
attributes the basic causes of war to a developmental failure at this point, see HUXLEY,
ENDS AND MEANS (1937).
117 ALEXANDER & STAUB, op. cit. stpra, note 2; RADzINoWICZ, MENTAL ABNORMAL-
ITY AND CRME (1944) ; Glover, Psychiatric Aspects Of the Report on Capital Punish-
,ent, 17 MODERN L. REv. 329 (1954).
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crime is required by the theory before a defendant might qualify for
public sacrifice and public education. Although the basic idea is that
"punishment for crime is provided because of its deterrent effect on
the commission of crime,"1 8 the core concept is the prevention of oth-
ers from committing crime -- a particular defendant is a mere instru-
ment to an end.' Since he is a tool, influencing others by his sad
plight, deterrence theory logically allows punishment without crime,
and suspicion would work out equally as well.'
Bound up with considerations of capital punishment are the ethics
of execution which concern themselves with equitable and befitting
modes of administering the final coup de grace. Historically, it has
been believed most degrading and indecorous to enter Valhalla by less
than noble means. Human psychology is totally remarkable in that
it was once thought more honorable to have one's head cut off than
one's neck broken-and that the sword was a less degrading instru-
ment than the axe. 2 Besides burning women who had murdered their
husbands (actually, before the faggots were lit the executioner usu-
ally strangled them at the stake) later ages saw the axe for the gentle-
men and the rope for the common herd come to be the popularly
approved fashions in England. It took two whacks to lop the head of
Sir Walter Raleigh which was then put into a red leather bag and
conveyed to his Lady. 3 A far cry from the pitiless, medieval sen-
tence pronounced at Shrewsbury upon David, the last native Prince of
Wales, three hundred years earlier:"4 "To be drawn to the gallows as
a traitor to the King who made him a knight, to be hanged as the
murderer of the gentleman taken in the Castle of Hawarden, to have
his limbs burnt because he had profaned by assassination the solem-
nity of Christ's passion, and to have his quarters dispersed through
the country because he had in different places compassed the death
of his Lord, the King."
Following Raleigh by 150 years was Robert Francois Damiens, a
would-be stabber of France's Louis XV. The executioner first burnt
off Damiens' hand which held the knife. He thrust it into the bright
118 State v. Stuttard, 151 Wash. 694, 697, 277 Pac. 83 (1929).
119 Andenaes, op. cit. supra note 88.
120 Per Judge Heath: "You are sentenced to be hanged, not because you stole the
horse, but in order to prevent others from stealing horses." From Du CANE, PUNISH-
MENT AND PREVENTION OF CRIME 2 (1885) quoted from Redmount, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 431.
121 Id. at 430.
12 2 LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 28.
123 Id. at 190.
124 Id. at 6; see also, ANDREWS, BYGONE PUNISHMENTS (1899).
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flames of brimstohe and then with hot pincers and later, after sever-
hag sinews, tore apart. poor Damiens with a team of horses, one at-
tached to each limb."s A witness at the scene, the famous Casanova,
said that he was several times obliged to turn away his face and to
stop his ears as he heard .the piercing' shrieks, "half his body having
been torn from him."' 20 Nor was such pitiless tyranny peculiarly pro-
vincial to France. It was not until 1814 that disembowelling and burn-
ing them in front of the unhappy, writhing wretch was abolished in
our Anglo-Saxon progenitor, England, and nearly sixty years more
were to pass before acts allowing drawing and quartering were re-
voked in 18701127 , I
Today, there are five main methods of execution used in the West-
ern World. France and Belgium, uthorize the guillotine;. electrocu-
tion is approved by twenty-two states;, hanging is practiced in seven
states, and eleven allow lethal gas. Utah offers the condemned an
option between hanging. or shooting,'28 and shooting is the usual mili-
tary mode, of executing. Two of the five techniques-the guillotine
and the firing squad-are obviously of dubious merit and need con-
cern us little. The guillotine is an effective instrument-:-quick, fool-
proof, and certain, but the mutilation it produces is so shocking that
no state has yet dared to use it. The firing squad lies at the other
extreme and is inefficient, clumsy, and expensive. It requires a-multi-
plicity of execittioners who are hard to doihe by these days. This leaves
hanging, electrocution,, and lethal gas as the primary modes of exe-
cuting in the, United States. Ironically*, they must be appreciated, by
a condemned prizoner. For abhorrent as death is,- a prisoner must be
sane at his execution for the law does not allow the killing of the
insane-they cannot properly. appreciate the ritual.
Hanging 2 "usually occurs in a small room with the trap occupying
most of the floor of the death chamber.' The trap is formed by hinged
leaves which drop when the lever is pulled. Above the trap is a
12 5 ScoTr, THE HISTORY or CAPITAL. PUNISHMENT 153 (1950).
.
20 Id. at 155.
127 LAURENCE, op. cit. rupra note 122, at 30.
128 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-16 (1953). In 1958-the first time since 1912-a con-
demned prisoner chose hanging to the firing squad, twenty-six others during this period
having chosen to die by shooting. National Prisoner Statistics, Executions, Pederal
Bureau of Prisons 1, (Feb. 1959).
120 Seven states including Washington, allowv hanging: See IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 19-2716 (1948) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 792.9 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. § 62-2401
(1949) ; MONT. Ray. CODE ANN. § 94-8016 (1947) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 607.6
(1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-16 (1953) ; and RCW 10.70.090.
130 1 draw heavily from the ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REPORT,
op. cit. sitpra note 7, at 246-273 for factual descriptions of executions by hanging,
electrocution and gas.
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standard-length rope attached to an adjustable chain which is fitted
into an overhead beam. The length of the chain can be adjusted to
make the distance of the drop most effective according to the height
and weight of the prisoner. During an execution the prisoner's arms
are pinioned behind his back; his legs tied, and a hood slipped over
his head. The noose fits around his neck, and the knot which is held
in place by a sliding ring is drawn tight to the left of the lower jaw
assuring a quick breaking of the neck. This is a recent innovation
and in bygone times a struggling wretch strangled slowly. Time varies,
but usually about six minutes lapse from leaving the condemned cell
to triggering the trap. Although the heart may beat up to twenty min-
utes, death ensues in about a minute from crushing and breaking by
the cord, and there is no chance of recovery. Hanging is undoubtedly
the fastest method of execution.
Electrocution occurs in the District of Columbia, in Sing Sing prison
and in twenty-one of our states.'" ' Generally, the electric chair is a
permanent fixture. It usually takes about six minutes from leaving the
condemned cell to execution. The report of the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment describes the Washington, D. C. electrocution
procedure as follows: The execution takes place at 10 a.m. At mid-
night on the preceding night the condemned man is taken from the
condemned cell block to a cell adjoining the electrocution chamber.
About 5:30 a.m. the top of his head and the calf of one leg are shaved
to afford direct contact with the electrodes. (The prisoner is usually
handcuffed during this operation to prevent him from seizing the
razor.) At 7:15 a.m. the death warrant is read to him and about 10
o'clock he is taken to the electrocution chamber. Five witnesses are
present (including members of the press) and two doctors. Three
officers strap the condemned man to the chair, tieing him round the
waist, legs, and wrists. A mask is placed over his face, and the elec-
trodes are attached to his head and legs. As soon as this operation is
completed (about two minutes after he has left the cell) the signal
is given and the switch is pulled by the electrician; the current is left
131 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 343 (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2611 (1947);
CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 54-100 (1958) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.10 (1944) ; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2512 (1953); ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 38, § 749 (Supp. 1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §
9-2236 (Burns 1956); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431:220 (1959); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:569
(West Supp. 1959) ; MASS. STAT. ANN. c. 279, § 46 (Supp. 1959) ; NEB. REV. STAT.
c. 29, § 2504 (1956); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :165-1 (1953) ; N.Y. CODE CR. PR. § 505
(1958); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.22 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1121
(Purdon 1930); S.C. CODE § 55-373 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3117 (1955);
TEX. CODE CR. PR. art 798 (Vernon 1950) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7106 (1958)
VA. CODE § 19-275 (1950) ; W.VA. CODE § 6249 (1955).
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on for two minutes. When it is switched off, the body slumps forward
in the chair. The leg is sometimes slightly burned, but the body is
not otherwise marked or mutilated. So far as is known no special diffi-
culties arise in the execution of women; and there has been no case in
Washington, D. C. Some other states have reported occasions when
the current failed to reach the chair when the switch was engaged.
Many have installed an emergency generator in order that an execu-
tion may not be delayed by a failure of power.
Lethal gas involves a very elaborate procedure in comparison to
the appartus needed for other methods of execution." 2 It is expensive
and requires a complicated series of operations. The chamber is a her-
metically sealed room with one-way observation windows. The doors
are electrically controlled. The prisoner is placed in the cell, clothing
removed except for shorts, and the head of a stethoscope is strapped
over the apex of his heart with broad strips of adhesive. After being
strapped into a chair the stethoscope is connected to a tube which
leads outside to a physician's stand. The last person who leaves the
chamber removes the cover from an acid container filled with sulfuric
acid and water and which is located beneath the chair. The doors to the
chamber close, and sodium cyanide pellets are automatically dropped
into the acid by an electrically controlled switch. Unconsciousness
ensues rapidly, and the total lapse of time from entrance of a guard
into the prisoner's cell, after he has been prepared, to unconscious-
ness is about seven minutes. After the attending physician pronounces
the prisoner dead, ammonia gas is forced into the chamber until the
cyanide is neutralized.
Which of these three widely practiced methods of execution do you
prefer? On grounds of humanity and decency, all executions should
have as few pointless preliminaries as possible and be productive of
instant unconsciousness followed by certain death. In addition, muti-
lation and distorton of the body should be avoided. It is handed over
and buried by the next-of-kin. They are innocent and should be
spared every possible pain.
Hanging is vastly superior in that it unquestionably takes the least
amount of time and requires the fewest preliminaries, but it returns
to relatives a grotesque and mutilated carcass with an elongated neck.
1-32 Twelve states authorize gas: Aaxz. REv. STAT. § 13-1654 (1956) ; CAL. PENAL
CODE § 3604 (West 1956); COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-11-1 (1953); MD. CODE ANN. art
27, § 71 (1957) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2550 (1956) ; Nav. REv. STAT. § 176.460 (1959) ;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-14-12 (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-187 (1953); Oxt.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014 (1958) (electrocution required till a lethal gas chamber is
available); ORE. REv. STAT. § 137.420 (1959) ; Wyo. STAT. § 7-391 (1957).
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Not a happy burial sight. Besides requiring much advance prepara-
tion, thereby torturing a condemned man, electrocution returns a
corpse with its head and leg shaved and burned. Lethal gas produces
the best body for burial, but it requires many more advance prelimi-
naries than either of the others forewarning the gruesome event. Which
is really the most "humane"? Can one be "humane" and kill? Yet
shouldn't we try for the greatest amount of decency, certainty, and
humanity in our modes of execution? But, if we are led by these and
greater humanitarian ideals and come to soften the blow of executions,
then aren't we really lessening the fearfulness of capital punishment
and thereby insuring its failure to protect society?
Washington has had an inconsistent history with the death penalty.
The measure was in force for fifty-nine years (1854-1913), abolished
for six, and now has been in effect for forty-one. 3 Records indicate
that from 1904 until April 1, 1960, a total of sixty-four executions
have taken place in Washington prisons; before that date, the sheriffs
used to carry out the executions in their own counties.' The pre-
cipitating factor accounting for a restoration of the death penalty
appears to be emotional rather than rational. In 1917, John Van Dell
murdered one E. W. Olson, a very popular industrial insurance com-
missioner and personal friend of many legislators. 5 Van Dell boasted
that since Washington had repealed the death penalty, the most the
state could do was board him for life! 3 . Incensed by Van Dell's
string of impertinencies, sentiment flared, and the legislature suc-
cumbed to its urge to punish and restored the death penalty on March
14, 1919."7 The Washington legislature has twice changed its mind on
capital punishment and could do so again. However, emotional over-
tones flowing from another Van Dell case could cause havoc, should
we fail to learn from our own history.
The choice of capital punishment is manifest and must be made
midst an awareness that errors of criminal justice occur and that in-
nocent citizens are wrongly convicted.' More than one innocent man's
133 See, Hayner & Cranor, The Death Penalty In Washington State, 284 Annals
101 (1952).
134 Letter to the author from B. J. R hay, Superintendent, Washington State Peni-
tentiary.
135 For a more complete account see Hayner & Cranor, op. cit. supra note 133, at
101-102.
136 The bill was not exorbitant for Van Dell lived only four years after conviction,
Id. at 102, n. 4. Currently, the cost of keeping a prisoner is slightly less than $4.00
per day.
137 Wash. Sess. Laws, 1919, c. 112 amending §§ 2392 of REm. CODE ANN. and BA.
CODE ANN.
13s For compilations see, FRANK & FRANK, NOT GuILTY (1957); BORCHARD, CON-
[ VoL-. 35
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
reprieve has reached him in the death cell, and sadly enough, others
would have been too late. The end of law is to promote the good life.
Socrates was condemned to drink the hemlock; Christ was crucified,
and numerous lesser luminaries have been legally lynched by the death
penalty. Are we really better off for it?
Lafayette's dictum is penetrating, "I shall ask for the abolition of
the penalty of death until I have the infallibility of human judgment
demonstrated to me."'3 9
VICTING THE INNOcENT (1932); Pollak, The Errors of Justice, 284 Annals 115 (1952);
and Hirschberg, Wrongful Convictions, 13 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 20 (1940).
139 Quoted in Pollak, op. cit. supra note 138.
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